By Seyed Hossein Mousavian | Analysis | September 18, 2026
On Thursday, the UN Security Council failed to pass a US resolution during a meeting on non-proliferation. The resolution, which sought to extend the UN’s ability to assess Iran’s compliance with international nuclear sanctions, was vetoed by China and Russia (photo). The resolution raised concerns about whether it could become the basis for another US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, as happened in June 2025 after an IAEA board resolution against Iran was followed by Israeli and US military strikes the next day. (UN Photo/Loey Felipe)Share
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Iran’s nuclear dispute has entered a new and potentially more dangerous phase. Repeated US and Israeli threats of further strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—particularly the newly identified underground complex of Kuh-e Kolang (literally “pickaxe mountain”), whose construction Iran publicly announced in 2020—are converging with mounting diplomatic pressure. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has again found Tehran in non-compliance with its safeguard obligations, with Iran’s nuclear file returning to the UN Security Council.
Unlike previous crises, two parallel legal tracks are now converging. Europe’s initiative in 2025 to trigger the “snapback” mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which allows a participant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to notify the Security Council of significant Iranian non-performance and, if the Council does not act within 30 days, automatically reimposes the UN sanctions that had been lifted under the nuclear agreement. In addition, the IAEA’s referral to the Security Council of Iran’s alleged non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Together, these developments could redefine Iran’s nuclear file as a threat to international peace and security, potentially opening the way to sanctions and, under certain circumstances, measures under the UN Charter. On Thursday, however, China and Russia blocked a US resolution at the UN to keep monitoring sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and further isolate the Islamic Republic. The two permanent members of the Security Council also rejected the “snapback” mechanism against Iran, which Russian UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia said had no legal basis.
The renewed referral of Tehran’s nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council, in particular, raises a critical question: Could it once again become the legal and political prelude to another US-Israeli military campaign against Iran—one that would allow President Donald Trump to claim his own “mission accomplished” moment?
The concern is not hypothetical. In June 2025, an IAEA board resolution against Iran was followed within 24 hours by Israeli and US military strikes. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the IAEA and its director general, Rafael Grossi, “fully responsible” for the attack on Iran.
Iran’s nuclear file is no longer merely a technical or legal issue. It has become a geopolitical contest over regional order, energy security, and the future of relations between Iran and the West. The central dispute is about Iran’s geopolitical role, the future of the Islamic Republic, and the realization of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeatedly stated vision of a “New Middle East”—without Iran.
Preventing a far more dangerous confrontation requires replacing war, coercion, and regime-change policies with a comprehensive diplomatic settlement—one that addresses not only the nuclear issue but also regional security, freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, and replaces Israel-Iran mutual military-security and existential threats with a stable framework for peaceful coexistence. Only such an approach offers a realistic path to ending nearly five decades of recurring confrontation.
Is the nuclear program really the central issue? As legal and diplomatic pressure has intensified, statements by senior US officials have reinforced Tehran’s belief that the nuclear issue itself is no longer the ultimate objective. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said a new series of economic measures will “collapse” the Iranian government, urging countries to join the effort.
A conflict of attrition: Iran’s bet on asymmetric warfare
Recent developments expose a striking strategic inconsistency. Washington is willing to accept uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia under a civilian nuclear cooperation framework. It continues to tolerate Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal. And it now treats North Korea as a negotiating partner despite its withdrawal from the NPT and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Still, Iran remains subject to one of the most comprehensive nuclear-related sanctions regimes in modern history, which are accompanied by repeated military threats and explicit calls for regime change.
Many in Tehran increasingly interpret the current trajectory through the prism of Iraq in 2003, when US forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the search intensified for evidence of Iraq’s alleged “weapons of mass destruction.” But the weapons were nowhere to be found.
After diplomacy, sanctions, covert operations, and military force failed to achieve Washington’s key objectives, the United States launched “Economic D-Day” against Iran—an unprecedented campaign of economic warfare including “sea and air blockade.” Its apparent objective is to combine financial coercion, international isolation, and the threat of further military action to weaken Iran’s economy, destabilize the state, and ultimately bring about regime change.
President Trump’s own remarks have further reinforced this perception. “If Iran had a nuclear weapon, I’d be calling the Supreme Leader and I’d be saying, ‘Mr. Supreme Leader, how are you, sir? Is there anything we can do for you?’—as opposed to bombing the crap out of him,” he said. For many within Iran’s political and security establishment, such statements reinforce an increasingly influential conclusion: Possessing nuclear weapons may constitute the only truly effective deterrent against externally imposed regime change.
However, the military confrontations of 2025 and 2026 imposed high costs on all sides. The wars also contributed to unprecedented volatility in global energy markets. Oil prices soared to over $100 per barrel, heightened threats to maritime security, exposed the vulnerability of US military bases throughout the region, and raised growing concerns over the security of critical energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf. The wars inflicted hundreds of billions of dollars in economic damage on Iran—which the United States said it would cover as part of the memorandum of understanding signed in June—and left tens of thousands dead and wounded, underscoring the enormous human and financial toll of the continued military confrontation.
At the same time, Iran’s parliament has begun considering emergency legislation that could ultimately lead to Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT. Many within Iran increasingly argue that continued adherence to the treaty has become a source of national insecurity, and many in Tehran view the IAEA as having been transformed into an instrument facilitating US and Israeli military pressure. The Agency’s resolution served as justification utilized by the United States and Israel to initiate their bombing campaign in June 2025. Now, Iranian lawmakers are stepping up calls for a tougher nuclear stance toward the United States, with a spokesman for the Iranian parliament’s presiding board saying that only the “logic of power” works in dealing with Washington.
Moreover, last week, the Houthi fighters reached Perim Island—which divides Bab el-Mandeb, the gateway into the Red Sea, into two shipping lanes—thereby completing the takeover of the strait by an ally of Tehran. Together with Iran’s Hormuz blockade, this puts roughly a third of the world’s seaborne trade under hostile control.
A way out of the deadlock. Let’s be clear. Neither sanctions nor military force can provide a durable solution to the current crisis.
The first step should be for Washington and Tehran to return to the Islamabad memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 17 and to immediately resume direct negotiations. In the Islamabad MoU, Iran committed to not procure or develop nuclear weapons, address its stockpiled enriched material through a mutually agreed mechanism with on-site down-blending under IAEA supervision as the minimum methodology, and maintain the existing status quo of its nuclear program pending a final deal. The MoU also envisaged negotiations on enrichment and other aspects of Iran’s nuclear needs, with the final arrangements to be confirmed in a subsequent agreement. However, properly implemented, the Islamabad framework could evolve beyond a temporary understanding into a comprehensive grand bargain capable of addressing not only the nuclear dispute but also the broader regional security architecture.
A second step could be for both governments to negotiate a new comprehensive bilateral nuclear treaty rather than pursuing another temporary political arrangement vulnerable to future political change. Under such a treaty, Iran would permanently renounce nuclear weapons while preserving its internationally recognized right to peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT. In return, the United States would permanently remove nuclear-related sanctions. Ratification by both the US Congress and the Iranian Parliament would provide a level of political durability that previous agreements never achieved.
In addition, Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf should establish a joint comprehensive framework for security and cooperation. Such a framework should guarantee maritime security, regional cooperation, and the uninterrupted flow of global energy supplies. It should also incorporate a multilateral regional nuclear consortium for uranium enrichment and fuel-cycle services, as some of us proposed before the start of the current conflict, in June 2025. Such a regional consortium would allow all states in the Persian Gulf to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology under joint ownership, international oversight, and the highest non-proliferation standards. It could also transform nuclear competition into regional cooperation while providing a durable foundation for a comprehensive nuclear settlement.
The Strait of Hormuz lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. The two countries have already reached an understanding on mechanisms to ensure freedom of navigation through the strait. The United States and the wider regional and international community should now support this regional framework rather than undermine it.
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